Multiverse

The multiverse is the hypothetical set of multiple possible universes (including the historical universe we consistently experience) that together comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, and energy as well as the physical laws and constants that describe them. The term was coined in 1895 by the American philosopher and psychologist William James. The various universes within the multiverse are sometimes called parallel universes.

The structure of the multiverse, the nature of each universe within it and the relationship between the various constituent universes, depend on the specific multiverse hypothesis considered. Multiverses have been hypothesized in cosmology, physics, astronomy, religion, and philosophy. In these contexts, parallel universes are also called ‘alternative universes,’ ‘quantum universes,’ and ‘alternative realities,’ among others.

Cosmologist Max Tegmark has provided a taxonomy of universes beyond the familiar observable universe. The levels according to Tegmark’s classification are arranged such that subsequent levels can be understood to encompass and expand upon previous levels. Level I ‘Beyond our cosmological horizon’ is a generic prediction of chaotic inflation is an infinite ergodic universe, which, being infinite, must contain Hubble volumes realizing all initial conditions. Accordingly, an infinite universe will contain an infinite number of Hubble volumes, all having the same physical laws and physical constants. In regard to configurations such as the distribution of matter, almost all will differ from our Hubble volume. However, because there are infinitely many, far beyond the cosmological horizon, there will eventually be Hubble volumes with similar, and even identical, configurations. This follows directly from the cosmological principle, wherein it is assumed our Hubble volume is not special or unique.

Level II ‘Universes with different physical constants’ delves into the chaotic inflation theory, a variant of the cosmic inflation theory, arguing the multiverse as a whole is stretching and will continue doing so forever, but some regions of space stop stretching and form distinct bubbles, like gas pockets in a loaf of rising bread. Such bubbles are embryonic level I multiverses. Different bubbles may experience different spontaneous symmetry breaking resulting in different properties such as different physical constants. This level also includes John Archibald Wheeler’s oscillatory universe theory and Lee Smolin’s fecund universes theory.

Level III ‘Many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics’ is derived from Hugh Everett. In brief, one aspect of quantum mechanics is that certain observations cannot be predicted absolutely. Instead, there is a range of possible observations, each with a different probability. According to the MWI, each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe. Suppose a die is thrown that contains six sides and that the numeric result of the throw corresponds to a quantum mechanics observable. All six possible ways the die can fall correspond to six different universes. (More correctly, in MWI there is only a single universe but after the ‘split’ into ‘many worlds’ these cannot in general interact.)

Tegmark argues that a level III multiverse does not contain more possibilities in the Hubble volume than a level I-II multiverse. In effect, all the different ‘worlds’ created by ‘splits’ in a level III multiverse with the same physical constants can be found in some Hubble volume in a level I multiverse. Tegmark writes that ‘The only difference between Level I and Level III is where your doppelgängers reside. In Level I they live elsewhere in good old three-dimensional space. In Level III they live on another quantum branch in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.’ Similarly, all level II bubble universes with different physical constants can in effect be found as ‘worlds’ created by ‘splits’ at the moment of spontaneous symmetry breaking in a level III multiverse.

Level IV ‘Ultimate Ensemble’ is the hypothesis of Tegmark himself. This level considers equally real all universes that can be described by different mathematical structures. Tegmark writes that ‘abstract mathematics is so general that any Theory Of Everything (TOE) that is definable in purely formal terms (independent of vague human terminology) is also a mathematical structure. For instance, a TOE involving a set of different types of entities (denoted by words, say) and relations between them (denoted by additional words) is nothing but what mathematicians call a set-theoretical model, and one can generally find a formal system that it is a model of.’ He argues this ‘implies that any conceivable parallel universe theory can be described at Level IV’ and ‘subsumes all other ensembles, therefore brings closure to the hierarchy of multiverses, and there cannot be say a Level V.’

In several theories there is a series of infinite, self-sustaining cycles (for example: an eternity of Big Bang-Big crunches).

A multiverse of a somewhat different kind has been envisaged within the multi-dimensional extension of string theory known as M-theory, also known as Membrane Theory. In M-theory our universe and others are created by collisions between p-branes in a space with 11 and 26 dimensions (the number of dimensions depends on the chirality of the observer); each universe takes the form of a D-brane. Objects in each universe are essentially confined to the D-brane of their universe, but may be able to interact with other universes via gravity, a force which is not restricted to D-branes. This is unlike the universes in the ‘quantum multiverse,’ but both concepts can operate at the same time.

A black-hole cosmology is a cosmological model in which the observable Universe is the interior of a black hole existing as one of possibly many inside a larger universe.

The concept of other universes has been proposed to explain how our Universe appears to be fine-tuned for conscious life as we experience it. If there were a large (possibly infinite) number of universes, each with possibly different physical laws (or different fundamental physical constants), some of these universes, even if very few, would have the combination of laws and fundamental parameters that are suitable for the development of matter, astronomical structures, elemental diversity, stars, and planets that can exist long enough for life to emerge and evolve. The weak anthropic principle could then be applied to conclude that we (as conscious beings) would only exist in one of those few universes that happened to be finely tuned, permitting the existence of life with developed consciousness. Thus, while the probability might be extremely small that any particular universe would have the requisite conditions for life (as we understand life) to emerge and evolve, this does not require intelligent design per the teleological argument as the only explanation for the conditions in the Universe that promote our existence in it.

In his ‘NY Times’ opinion piece, ‘A Brief History of the Multiverse,’ author and cosmologist, Paul Davies, offers a variety of arguments that multiverse theories are non-scientific: ‘For a start, how is the existence of the other universes to be tested? To be sure, all cosmologists accept that there are some regions of the universe that lie beyond the reach of our telescopes, but somewhere on the slippery slope between that and the idea that there are an infinite number of universes, credibility reaches a limit. As one slips down that slope, more and more must be accepted on faith, and less and less is open to scientific verification. Extreme multiverse explanations are therefore reminiscent of theological discussions. Indeed, invoking an infinity of unseen universes to explain the unusual features of the one we do see is just as ad hoc as invoking an unseen Creator. The multiverse theory may be dressed up in scientific language, but in essence it requires the same leap of faith.’

Taking cosmic inflation as a popular case in point, George Ellis provides a balanced criticism of not only the science, but as he suggests, the scientific philosophy, by which multiverse theories are generally substantiated. He, like most cosmologists, accepts Tegmark’s level I ‘domains,’ even though they lie far beyond the cosmological horizon. Likewise, the multiverse of cosmic inflation is said to exist very far away. It would be so far away, however, that it’s very unlikely any evidence of an early interaction will be found. He argues that for many theorists, the lack of empirical testability or falsifiability is not a major concern. ‘Many physicists who talk about the multiverse, especially advocates of the string landscape, do not care much about parallel universes per se. For them, objections to the multiverse as a concept are unimportant. Their theories live or die based on internal consistency and, one hopes, eventual laboratory testing.’

Although he believes there’s little hope that will ever be possible, he grants that the theories on which the speculation is based, are not without scientific merit. He concludes that multiverse theory is a ‘productive research program’: ‘As skeptical as I am, I think the contemplation of the multiverse is an excellent opportunity to reflect on the nature of science and on the ultimate nature of existence: why we are here… In looking at this concept, we need an open mind, though not too open. It is a delicate path to tread. Parallel universes may or may not exist; the case is unproved. We are going to have to live with that uncertainty. Nothing is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it is.’

Critics argue that to postulate a practically infinite number of unobservable universes just to explain our own seems contrary to Occam’s razor. Max Tegmark answers: ‘A skeptic worries about all the information necessary to specify all those unseen worlds. But an entire ensemble is often much simpler than one of its members. This principle can be stated more formally using the notion of algorithmic information content. The algorithmic information content in a number is, roughly speaking, the length of the shortest computer program that will produce that number as output. For example, consider the set of all integers. Which is simpler, the whole set or just one number? Naively, you might think that a single number is simpler, but the entire set can be generated by quite a trivial computer program, whereas a single number can be hugely long. Therefore, the whole set is actually simpler. Similarly, the set of all solutions to Einstein’s field equations is simpler than a specific solution. The former is described by a few equations, whereas the latter requires the specification of vast amounts of initial data on some hypersurface. The lesson is that complexity increases when we restrict our attention to one particular element in an ensemble, thereby losing the symmetry and simplicity that were inherent in the totality of all the elements taken together. In this sense, the higher-level multiverses are simpler. Going from our universe to the Level I multiverse eliminates the need to specify initial conditions, upgrading to Level II eliminates the need to specify physical constants, and the Level IV multiverse eliminates the need to specify anything at all.’

He continues: ‘A common feature of all four multiverse levels is that the simplest and arguably most elegant theory involves parallel universes by default. To deny the existence of those universes, one needs to complicate the theory by adding experimentally unsupported processes and ad hoc postulates: finite space, wave function collapse and ontological asymmetry. Our judgment therefore comes down to which we find more wasteful and inelegant: many worlds or many words. Perhaps we will gradually get used to the weird ways of our cosmos and find its strangeness to be part of its charm.’

‘Possible worlds’ are a way of explaining probability, hypothetical statements and the like, and some philosophers such as David Lewis believe that all possible worlds exist, and are just as real as the actual world (a position known as modal realism). A metaphysical issue that crops up in multiverse schema that posit infinite identical copies of any given universe is that of the notion that there can be identical objects in different possible worlds. According to the counterpart theory of David Lewis, the objects should be regarded as similar rather than identical. Fictional Realism is the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well. There are fictional entities, in the same sense in which, setting aside philosophical disputes, there are people, Mondays, numbers and planets.

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